A Wolf in Sheep\u27s Clothing: UNOCAL and the Defensive Mechanism Hidden in Corporate Benefit Purpose by Brownridge, Sean W.
Volume 60 Issue 5 Article 2 
1-1-2016 
A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing: UNOCAL and the Defensive 
Mechanism Hidden in Corporate Benefit Purpose 
Sean W. Brownridge 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Sean W. Brownridge, A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing: UNOCAL and the Defensive Mechanism Hidden in 
Corporate Benefit Purpose, 60 Vill. L. Rev. 903 (2016). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol60/iss5/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova 
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\60-5\VLR502.txt unknown Seq: 1 10-DEC-15 16:33
2015]
A WOLF IN SHEEP’S CLOTHING:
UNOCAL AND THE DEFENSIVE MECHANISM HIDDEN IN
CORPORATE BENEFIT PURPOSE
SEAN W. BROWNRIDGE*
I. INTRODUCTION
MILTON Friedman infamously declared corporate social responsibil-ity programs to be “hypocritical window-dressing,”1 ignorant of the
reality that “there is one and only one social responsibility of business—to
use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so
long as it stays within the rules of the game . . . .”2  Indeed, the Chief
Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, Leo E. Strine Jr., has plainly en-
dorsed profit maximization as the primary foundational principle of mod-
ern corporate purpose.3  Positions similar to those of Friedman and Strine
have historically been commonplace in the corporate community,4 al-
though such perspectives have been challenged in recent years by the ben-
efit corporation movement and the codification of the for-profit, mission-
driven entity in state corporation statutes.5
* I am very grateful to my family and friends for their support.  Special
thanks to Keenan Lynch for his thoughts and comments on this Article, and to the
members of the Villanova Law Review for their time and effort.  The views
expressed herein are solely those of the author.
1. See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Prof-
its, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970 [hereinafter Friedman, Social Responsibility],
available at http://www.colorado.edu/studentgroups/libertarians/issues/fried-
man-soc-resp-business.html [https://perma.cc/X6EM-6FCK?type=image] (refer-
encing MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (40th anniversary ed.
2002) (1962)).
2. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea That For-Profit Corpora-
tions Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 171 (2012) [hereinafter Strine, Our
Continuing Struggle] (alteration in original) (quoting Friedman, Social Responsibility,
supra note 1) (internal quotation marks omitted).
3. See generally id.
4. See generally Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc. (In re Para-
mount Commc’ns Inc. S’holders’ Litig.), 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994); Paramount
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc. (In re Time Inc. S’holder Litig.), 571 A.2d 1140 (Del.
1989); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del.
1986); eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010); see
also William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 261, 264–65 (1992) (“In the [property] conception, the corporation
is seen as the private property of its stockholder-owners . . . and the function of
directors, as agents of the owners, is faithfully to advance the financial interests of
the owners. . . .  This model might almost as easily be called a contract model,
because in its most radical form, the corporation tends to disappear, transformed
from a substantial institution into just a relatively stable corner of the market in
which autonomous property owners freely contract.”).
5. See CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 14620–14623 (West 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§§ 361–368 (2013); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-01 (West 2012); N.Y.
(903)
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Benefit corporations are social enterprises guided by responsibility in-
itiatives through which the organization strives to achieve varying degrees
and forms of “material positive impact on society and the environment.”6
The primary proponent of the benefit corporation movement has been B
Lab, a nonprofit organization formed in 2006.7  Since its inception, B Lab
has facilitated the passing of over twenty-seven laws, calling for the incor-
poration of entities required to produce social and environmental bene-
fits, in addition to financial profits.8  With purpose, accountability, and
transparency as guiding principles, benefit corporations have been con-
ducting business since 2010, when Maryland and Vermont became the
first states to embrace the for-profit, mission-driven entity effort.9  Most
significantly, in July 2013, Delaware enacted Sections 361–368 of the Dela-
ware General Corporation Law (DGCL), providing for the incorporation
of socially and environmentally conscious public benefit corporations.10
Several years prior to the enactment of Sections 361–368, in 1985,
when Justice Moore of the Delaware Supreme Court penned the decision
in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,11 corporate social responsibility pro-
grams were evolving and beginning to carve significant niches within the
business landscape.12  Yet, understanding of the corporate model was
predominantly centered on the so-called property conception of the cor-
poration, most notably promulgated by Chancellor William T. Allen sev-
eral years later.13  Under this framework, “the corporation is seen as the
private property of its stockholder-owners.  The corporation’s purpose is
to advance the purposes of these owners (predominantly to increase their
wealth) . . . .”14  Accordingly, in contrast to the mission-based purposes of
BUS. CORP. LAW §§ 1707(a)(1)(G)–1709 (McKinney 2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A,
§§ 21.03–.14 (2012).
6. See Steven Munch, Note & Comment, Improving the Benefit Corporation: How
Traditional Governance Mechanisms Can Enhance the Innovative New Business Form, 7
NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 170, 186 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also,
e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-01(c); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A,
§ 21.03(a)(4).
7. See Our History, B CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/
the-non-profit-behind-b-corps/our-history [http://perma.cc/GD5Z-CKKT] (last
updated Dec. 31, 2013); see also J. Haskell Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation: Dela-
ware’s Public Benefit Corporation Law, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 345, 348 (2014) [hereinaf-
ter Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation] (citing B Lab, Legislation, B CORP., http://
www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/legislation).
8. See State by State Status of Legislation, BENEFIT CORP., http://benefitcorp.net/
policymakers/state-by-state-status [http://perma.cc/LV6T-RK7L] (last visited Nov.
18, 2015).
9. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS §§ 5-6C-01–08; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A,
§§ 21.03–.14.
10. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 361–368.
11. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
12. See Archie B. Carroll, Corporate Social Responsibility: Evolution of a Definitional
Construct, 38 BUS. & SOC’Y 268, 284–88 (1999).
13. See Allen, supra note 4, at 264.
14. Id. at 264–65.
2
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benefit corporations, the results in cases that are members of the Unocal
family have been a product of the widely held belief that directors are
primarily tasked with both guarding and maximizing shareholder financial
value.15
The benefit corporation space broadens the scope of what is consid-
ered to be in the purview of shareholder value, however.16  Almost uni-
formly, in addition to the financial well-being of the stockholders, benefit
corporation statutes affirmatively require directors to consider the impact a
corporate action might have on employees, customers, communities, and
the environment, among other things.17  In pertinent part, Section 365(a)
of the Delaware General Corporation law provides the following:
The board of directors shall manage or direct the business and
affairs of the public benefit corporation in a manner that bal-
ances the pecuniary interests of the stockholders, the best inter-
ests of those materially affected by the corporation’s conduct,
and the specific public benefit or public benefits identified in its
certificate of incorporation.18
Much akin to benefit corporation statutes of other states, in excess of Sec-
tion 365(a)’s balancing test, the rather barren and ambiguous Delaware
public benefit corporation statutory provisions provide little guidance for
directors at such organizations with respect to their fiduciary duties.  In
view of this lack of specificity and clarity, the question remains as to the
precise manner in which the board of directors at a Delaware public bene-
fit corporation are required to balance the foregoing interests and, conse-
quently, how the notable cases of Unocal and Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc.19 will operate in the for-profit social enterprise con-
text, if at all.20
15. For a discussion of the shareholder wealth maximization norm and its
relationship to the holding in Unocal, see generally Bernard S. Sharfman, Share-
holder Wealth Maximization and Its Implementation Under Corporate Law, 66 FLA. L. REV.
389 (2014).
16. See generally William H. Clark, Jr. & Elizabeth K. Babson, How Benefit Corpo-
rations Are Redefining the Purpose of Business Corporations, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
817 (2012).
17. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365(a) (2013); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. &
ASS’NS § 5-6C-07 (2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.09(a)(3) (2010). But see
Munch, supra note 6, at 184 n.119 (discussing permissive nature of state constitu-
ency statutes, which permit, but do not require, that directors consider non-share-
holder interests in directing or managing affairs of the company).
18. tit. 8, § 365(a).
19. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
20. See generally tit. 8, § 366; Frederick H. Alexander et al., M&A Under Dela-
ware’s Public Benefit Corporation Statute: A Hypothetical Tour, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 255
(2014); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Making It Easier for Directors to “Do the Right Thing”?, 4
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235 (2014) [hereinafter Strine, Making It Easier]; Sean W.
Brownridge, Article, Canning Plum Organics: The Avant-Garde Campbell Soup Company
Acquisition and Delaware Public Benefit Corporations Wandering Revlon-Land, 39 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 703 (2015).
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Within the realm of legal scholarship, much ink has been spilled over
the Unocal saga and the doctrine it yields,21 although the reverberations of
the decision are necessary to understanding the modern challenges
presented to both the Delaware judiciary and legislature in their efforts to
integrate public benefit corporations into the nation’s foremost corporate
law framework.  In particular, the Unocal doctrine, in conjunction with
Sections 361–368 of the Delaware General Corporation Law, pose a di-
verse array of difficulties for directors at public benefit corporations,
where their company is subject to hostile overtures similar to those faced
by the defending boards at Unocal and Airgas.22  In the guise of benefit
purpose, however, directors at public benefit corporations have a defense
mechanism built into their corporate charter that directors at traditional,
profit-maximizing companies do not.  The balancing test articulated in
Section 365(a) affirmatively requires that directors at Delaware benefit
corporations manage the business and affairs of the company in a manner
that balances not only the financial interests of the stockholders, but the
best interests of those materially effected by the corporation’s conduct and
the specific public benefits identified in the company’s certificate of incor-
poration, as well.23
In satisfying their fiduciary duties and acting within Unocal’s en-
hanced scrutiny, the question, then, is whether public benefit corporation
directors are free to adopt a diversity of takeover defense mechanisms,
layering them on top of their statutorily granted authority to reject a hos-
tile offer on the grounds that it is not in the best interests of the com-
pany’s public benefit purpose or purposes.24  To the extent that directors
at public benefit corporations adopt defensive measures, do such mea-
sures, in certain contexts, breach the thresholds of preclusivity and coer-
civeness when combined with the corporation’s latitude to adhere to its
mission?  This Article seeks to answer these questions, among others.
Part II is a brief discussion of Unocal, its requirements, and its legacy.
Part III investigates how corporate benefit purpose works independent
from, and in tandem with, defensive instruments to effectively defend ben-
efit corporations from hostile acquirers, while touching on whether the
mixture of benefit purpose and defensive measures implicates questions of
21. For a discussion of Unocal, see generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal
at 20: Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 769 (2006); Ronald
J. Gilson, Unocal Fifteen Years Later (And What We Can Do About It), 26 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 491 (2001); Marcel Kahan, Paramount or Paradox: The Delaware Supreme Court’s
Takeover Jurisprudence, 19 J. CORP. L. 583 (1994).
22. See generally Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del.
1985); Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc. (In re Airgas Inc. S’holder Litig.),
16 A.3d 48 (Del. Ch. 2011).
23. See tit. 8, §§ 361–368.
24. See Alexander et al., supra note 20, at 272 (posing question of whether
“directors of a [public benefit corporation are] free to adopt deal protection mea-
sures of any deterrent effect they choose, as long as they can plausibly assert that
they did so in an effort to balance pecuniary and public purposes?”).
4
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preclusivity and coerciveness.  Using eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. New-
mark,25 Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas, Inc.,26 and the history of
conscientious Delaware jurisprudence as guideposts, Part IV sets forth a
framework for the judiciary to apply the Unocal test to public benefit cor-
porations.  Part V concludes that the defensive measure analysis propa-
gated by Unocal and the fiduciary obligations of directors at Delaware
public benefit corporations together provide mission-driven entities with
an uncertain, complex, and socially consequential defensive palette, with
externalities advantaging shareholders, stakeholders, and directors alike,
but which, as they currently exist in relationship to one another, require
clarification.  That is to say, public benefit purpose, while socially and envi-
ronmentally valuable, can function as a wolf in sheep’s clothing for direc-
tors defending against the overtures of a hostile acquirer.
II. A BRIEF SURVEY OF THE UNOCAL LEGACY
In Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum, T. Boone Pickens and Mesa Petroleum
Company made a two-tier, front-end-loaded tender offer for “approxi-
mately 37% [ ] of Unocal’s outstanding stock at a price of $54 per
share.”27  On the back-end, if the bidder successfully closed the tender
offer, it planned to squeeze out the non-tendering Unocal shareholders
via an issuance of “highly subordinated ‘junk bonds’” of a successor corpo-
ration in exchange for target stock.28  Unocal’s disinterested board re-
jected Mesa’s advances, in view of what they considered to be a “grossly
inadequate” price and unattractive use of debt securities.29
Furthermore, in response to the hostile approach on the company,
the Unocal board resolved to pursue a self-tender offer “to provide the
stockholders with a fairly priced alternative to the Mesa proposal” in the
event that Pickens reached his desired 51% ownership threshold.30  In
completing the self-tender, however, Unocal planned to exclude Pickens
and Mesa from the terms of the offer, effectively preventing the corporate
raider from closing on the coercive two-tier tender offer.31  Mesa filed for
an injunction in the Delaware Court of Chancery in response to the
board’s exclusionary strategy.32  On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court
concluded that the target board could engage in defensive measures to
25. 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010).
26. 16 A.3d 48 (Del. Ch. 2011).
27. See Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d at 949.
28. See id. at 949; id. at 957 (“Thus, the board’s decision to offer what it deter-
mined to be the fair value of the corporation to the 49% of its shareholders, who
would otherwise be forced to accept highly subordinated ‘junk bonds’, [sic] is rea-
sonable and consistent with the directors’ duty to ensure that the minority stock-
holders receive equal value for their shares.”).
29. See id. at 950.
30. Id.
31. See id. at 951.
32. See id. at 949.
5
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protect Unocal and its shareholders from what the directors perceived to
be the hostile bidder’s grossly inadequate and coercive offer.33
The takeaway from Unocal, however, is not the result in the case, par-
ticularly in view of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s subsequent
adoption of the All Holders Rule.34  Rather, the consequence is the well-
known Unocal test that the court engaged in.  In applying the Unocal stan-
dard of review to director actions, a court will engage in a two-part reason-
ableness and proportionality inquiry: first, the defensive measure taken
must be on reasonable grounds to believe that there is a threat posed to
corporate policy and effectiveness;35 and, second, as part of a “bifurcated
analysis,”36 the reviewing court will search whether the defensive measure
taken was “preclusive” or “coercive”37 and, if not, the court will determine
if it is within a permitted “range of reasonableness.”38
In deciding Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court
created a new standard [of review] . . . to monitor decisions by
target directors to enact defensive tactics when faced with a hos-
tile takeover.
. . . .
Unlike the business judgment rule, which places the initial
burden of proof on plaintiffs, this newly-created test requires the
target board to bear the burden of [proof] . . . .39
33. See id.  The Delaware Supreme Court provided:
Under the circumstances the board had both the power and duty to op-
pose a bid it perceived to be harmful to the corporate enterprise.  On this
record we are satisfied that the device Unocal adopted is reasonable in
relation to the threat posed, and that the board acted in the proper exer-
cise of sound business judgment.  We will not substitute our views for
those of the board if the latter’s decision can be “attributed to any ra-
tional business purpose.”
Id. (quoting Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971)).
34. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10 (2015).  The All Holders Rule requires that a
bidder, in a tender offer, make the offer available to “all security holders of the
class of securities subject to the tender offer” and that “[t]he consideration paid to
any security holder for securities tendered in the tender offer is the highest consid-
eration paid to any other security holder for securities tendered in the tender of-
fer.” Id. § 240.14d-10(a)(1)–(2).
35. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
36. Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, How to Prevent Hard Cases from Making Bad
Law: Bear Stearns, Delaware, and the Strategic Use of Comity, 58 EMORY L.J. 713, 724
(2009).
37. See id. (quoting Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp. (In re Unitrin, Inc.
S’holders Litig.), 651 A.2d 1361, 1387 (Del. 1995)).  For a discussion of how
“preclusive” and “coercive” are defined under Delaware takeover jurisprudence,
see infra notes 58–104 and accompanying text.
38. See id. (quoting In re Unitrin,, 651 A.2d at 1387) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
39. Mary Siegel, The Illusion of Enhanced Review of Board Actions, 15 U. PA. J.
BUS. L. 599, 609 (2013).  In order to satisfy the business judgment rule in Dela-
ware, disinterested directors must make a decision on “an informed basis, in good
faith and [with] the honest belief that the action taken [i]s in the best interests of
6
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What results, therefore, is “ ‘judicial examination at the threshold’ of the
board’s process as well as its decision, thereby providing both a subjective
and an objective review of the defensive tactic.”40  Nonetheless, “Unocal
[only] subjects a decision to reject an offer [for the target company] to an
enhanced review of the process by which this decision is arrived at, but not
to an independent review of the substantive merits of the decision.”41
This intermediate standard of review is “situated between the business
judgment rule and entire fairness,” such that directors receive the protec-
tions of the business judgment rule only after meeting the enhanced scru-
tiny of the Unocal test.42
In Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc.,43 the Delaware Su-
preme Court noted that the threats posed by hostile offers triggering the
first prong of the Unocal test can be categorized into three molds.44  The
Time case itself is representative of opportunity loss, the first type of threat,
“[where] a hostile offer might deprive target shareholders of the opportu-
nity to select a superior alternative offered by target management [or, we
would add, offered by another bidder].”45  “Structural coercion,” such as
was present in Unocal, where there is a “risk that disparate treatment of
non-tendering shareholders might distort shareholders’ tender decisions,”
is the second category of threat sparking enhanced analysis.46  Finally,
“substantive coercion”—coursing through the offer at issue in Air Products
& Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas—is the final threat recognized by the Delaware
Supreme Court in Time as sufficiently satisfying the first prong of the Uno-
cal test.47  “Substantive coercion [is] the risk that shareholders will mistak-
enly accept an under[-]priced offer because they disbelieve management’s
representations of intrinsic value.”48
Similarly, three scenarios typically trigger a Delaware court’s utiliza-
tion of the Unocal test: (1) a bidder appears and the target board is unin-
terested in participating in a business combination and employs defensive
measures to fend off the unwanted suitor;49 (2) a corporation implements
the” corporation.  Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on
other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
40. Siegel, supra note 39, at 610 (quoting Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954).
41. Kahan, supra note 21, at 588.
42. Sharfman, supra note 15, at 414 (citing Reis v. Hazelett Strip-Casting
Corp., 28 A.3d 442, 457 (Del. Ch. 2011)).
43. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
44. See id. at 1153 n.17.
45. Id. (alterations in original).
46. Id. See generally Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del.
1985).
47. See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc., 571 A.2d at 1153 n.17. See generally Air Prods.
& Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc. (In re Airgas Inc. S’holder Litig.), 16 A.3d 48 (Del.
Ch. 2011).
48. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc., 571 A.2d at 1153 n.17 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
49. See generally Unocal, 493 A.2d 946.
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a defensive measure prior to the arrival of a hostile acquirer and maintains
the thwarting mechanism in the face of the bidder;50 and (3) a corpora-
tion has a transaction in place, only to be interrupted by a third-party bid-
der, and the target’s board employs deal-protection mechanisms to
preserve the deal in place prior to the arrival of the unwanted
interloper.51
In applying the Unocal standard to board-level decisions, the Delaware
courts are “deferential” to corporate leadership on the back end.52  To the
extent that subject directors can show that they satisfied the two-pronged
Unocal enhanced scrutiny analysis,53 they will receive the benefit of the
business judgment rule, which requires only that the defendant director-
ship “acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief
that the action taken was in the best interests of the company,”54 particu-
larly where such actions and decisions are plainly related to “any rational
business purpose.”55  Consequently, in view of the broad range of available
rational business purposes, defendants are often afforded business judg-
ment review, such that they are infrequently held liable for breaching
their fiduciary duties.56  “In other words, the [business judgment] rule cre-
ates a presumption of deference to the board’s authority as the corpora-
50. See generally Airgas, 16 A.3d 48.
51. See generally Paramount Commc’ns, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140.
52. See Kahan, supra note 21, at 586.
53. See Siegel, supra note 39, at 608–10.
54. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954 (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812
(Del. 1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
55. Id. (quoting Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
56. See Bainbridge, supra note 21, at 860 n.391 (disagreeing with Stephen Frai-
din & Jon D. Hanson, Toward Unlocking Lockups, 103 YALE L.J. 1739 (1994)).  Frai-
din and Hanson state:
Delaware courts appear to intervene dramatically in board-room decision
making when a board decides to sell a firm to a specific bidder at a sub-
stantial premium, but show near-complete restraint when a board decides
(1) to reject any and all offers regardless of the premium being offered,
(2) to authorize a “merger of equals” transaction in which their company
merges with another and the shareholders receive no premium for their
stock (and perhaps even receive less than market value for their stock), or
(3) to purchase another firm at substantial premium (and perhaps over-
paying).  The “inherent” conflicts of interest which Delaware courts claim
to find so troubling in the takeover context would appear to be most
severe in the last three settings and . . . virtually non-existent in the first.
If judicial restraint is appropriate in the last three settings, in which a
board is rejecting or paying a substantial shareholder premium, it is
surely appropriate in the first setting, in which a board of directors is
accepting a substantial shareholder premium.
Fraidin & Hanson, supra, at 1832–33 (footnotes omitted).  Bainbridge, instead, ar-
gues “Delaware courts do not routinely defer to board decision making in the first
numbered setting [above].”  Brainbridge, supra note 21, at 860 n.391.  While the
presumption of deference typically shields director decisions, “Delaware courts
carefully examine the board’s decision-making process to determine whether the
board acted from proper or improper motives.” Id.
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tion’s central and final decision maker,”57 casting a protective shadow over
defendant directorships.
III. PUBLIC BENEFIT PURPOSE AS A DEFENSIVE MEASURE AND THE
UNDERLYING DRACONIAN QUESTION
When Bart Houlahan joined AND 1, a basketball apparel and shoe
company, in the company’s infancy, the colorful brand’s “[r]evenues were
just $4 million.”58  In the process of scaling the business to $250 million,
AND 1 benefited from meaningfully high employee retention rates, in
part because the company boasted a basketball court in the office, yoga
classes, a mother’s room, and above-market wages.59  AND 1’s commit-
ment to the well-being of its employees crossed borders, reaching to its
production facilities in China, where the company competed with global
corporations such as Nike and Reebok.60  In 2005, AND 1 was sold to
American Sporting Goods, which promptly “stripped” the shoe brand of
its “commitments to employees, to the environment and to the commu-
nity,” eliciting Houlahan’s desire to found B Lab, an organization that,
among other things, helps companies to “scale, raise capital, have a liquid-
ity event and still hold onto a mission.”61
One year following the adoption of Sections 361–368 of the Delaware
General Corporation Law, 184 companies converted or opted into the
public benefit corporation entity model, which reflects Houlahan’s view of
social enterprise.62  Unsurprisingly, given the age of the statutory provi-
sions permitting them, most public benefit corporations are currently
small-capitalization companies with brief operating histories and few third-
party shareholders, if any.63  However, the robust support for public bene-
fit corporations carries with it a youthful exuberance, effectively making
mission-driven entities attractive targets for larger companies that may be
57. Bainbridge, supra note 21, at 787.
58. B Lab’s Bart Houlahan: Building More Socially Responsible Corporations,
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Nov. 7, 2012), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/ar-
ticle/b-labs-bart-houlahan-building-more-socially-responsible-corporations/
[https://perma.cc/67CX-BH2E?type=image]; see also Board of Directors, B CORP.,
http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/the-non-profit-behind-b-corps/
board-of-directors [http://perma.cc/MU57-D3Z7] (last visited Nov. 19, 2015).
59. See B Lab’s Bart Houlahan: Building More Socially Responsible Corporations,
supra note 58.
60. See id.
61. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
62. Search, BENEFIT CORP INFO. CTR., http://benefitcorp.net/find-a-benefit-
corp/search [http://perma.cc/B8RW-3T9Q] (last visited Nov. 19, 2015).
63. See generally id. See also Alicia E. Plerhoples, Delaware Public Benefit Corpora-
tions 90 Days Out: Who’s Opting In?, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 247, 259 (2014) (finding
that “74% of public benefit corporations are most likely new corporations”); Alex-
ander et al., supra note 20, at 279 (acknowledging that, currently, many public
benefit corporations “remain closely held by a cohesive group of like-minded
stockholders with similar preferences regarding the balance between pecuniary
gain and the corporation’s stated public purpose”).
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seeking to diversify their business platforms and that are keen to capitalize
on a target public benefit corporation’s “access to a new and growing mar-
ket of socially responsible business.”64  Indeed, “profit-maximizing busi-
nesses will want to expand into [the social enterprise] market by acquiring
an established participant rather than starting their own brands.”65
While traditional corporations may desire to engage in a Pac-Man bus-
iness strategy in approaching mission-driven entities,66 public benefit pur-
pose effectively functions as a daunting takeover defense engrained in the
genetic makeup of a Delaware-based social enterprise, particularly when
coupled with traditional defensive mechanisms.67  Pursuant to Section
362(a)(1), a public benefit corporation is required to “[i]dentify within its
statement of business or purpose . . . [one] or more specific public bene-
fits to be promoted by the corporation . . . .”68  Accordingly, as discussed
in Part I, public benefit corporation directors are required to “manage or
direct the business and affairs of the public benefit corporation in a man-
ner that balances the pecuniary interests of the stockholders, the best in-
terests of those materially affected by the corporation’s conduct, and the
specific public benefit or public benefits identified in its certificate of in-
corporation.”69  Delaware public benefit corporation directors, conse-
quently, are statutorily mandated to consider the public benefit or the
public benefits articulated in the social enterprise’s certificate of incorpo-
ration when confronted with an offer for the company, even when such a
bid is hostile.  In that light, directors at public benefit corporations are
presumably free to defend against hostile offers by deploying benefit pur-
pose as a justification for rejection without fearing liability under Unocal.
As a result, however, how directors go about defending their company
from a hostile bid is critical to the preservation of a public benefit corpora-
tion’s mission-driven purpose.70
Not only do directors of public benefit corporations have the latitude
to manage and direct the affairs of the company in a manner that consid-
ers the public benefits identified in the company’s certificate of incorpora-
64. Alicia E. Plerhoples, Can an Old Dog Learn New Tricks? Applying Traditional
Corporate Law Principles to New Social Enterprise Legislation, 13 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J.
BUS. L. 221, 235 (2012) (observing that acquisitions of benefit corporations by
traditional profit-maximizing corporation “leads to an immediate immersion in
the [social enterprise] market, marked by the legitimacy of the target social
enterprise”).
65. Id.
66. See Martin Lipton & Andrew R. Brownstein, Takeover Responses and Direc-
tors’ Responsibilities–An Update, 40 BUS. LAW. 1403, 1419 (1985) (providing “Pac-Man
counter tender offers became an accepted offensive and defensive strategy during
1982”); see also Steven Davidoff Solomon, Men’s Wearhouse Dusts Off the Pac-Man
Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2013, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/11/26/
mens-wearhouse-dusts-off-the-pac-man-defense/ [http://perma.cc/26F5-27ZM].
67. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362(a) (1) (2015).
68. Id.
69. tit. 8, § 365(a).
70. See Alexander et al., supra note 20, at 272.
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tion, they are also presumably free to utilize traditional defensive
mechanisms permitted under the Delaware law.71  The aforementioned
benefit purpose shield and traditional defensive measures, in tandem, pro-
vide a public benefit corporation with formidable armor, which may be
deployed upon demonstrating “‘reasonable grounds for believing that a
danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed.’  This burden is met
by reasonable investigation and a showing of good faith.”72  The question,
though, is whether the ability to “say no” to an offer for mission-based
purposes, in combination with the authority to employ additional defen-
sive measures, rises to the level of preclusive or coercive in certain con-
texts, as most notably discussed in Versata Enterprises, Inc. v. Selectica, Inc.73
There, the Delaware Supreme Court reiterated that a coercive response to
an unwanted bid “is one that is aimed at ‘cramming down’ on its share-
holders a management-sponsored alternative.”74  Moreover, the court
noted that “[a] defensive measure is preclusive where it makes a bidder’s
ability to wage a successful proxy contest and gain control either ‘mathe-
matically impossible’ or ‘realistically unattainable.’”75  That is to say, “a
response is ‘preclusive’ if it . . . precludes a bidder from seeking control by
fundamentally restricting proxy contests or otherwise.”76  Justices and
chancellors evaluating preclusion “must assess the likelihood of dissident
success given the existence of the various defenses.  Thus far, the courts
have relied on ad hoc discussions of individual target companies’ situa-
tions and piecemeal evidence of success in other contests in making their
determinations.”77
71. See generally tit. 8, §§ 361–368.
72. Sharfman, supra note 15, at 413–14 (footnote omitted) (quoting Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985)).
Reasonable investigation requires a showing that the board was ade-
quately informed under the gross negligence standard of review that was
established in Smith v. Van Gorkom.  The finding of good faith requires a
showing that the directors acted in response to a perceived threat to the
corporation and not out of self-interest.  A defensive measure fails the
good faith prong if it was implemented “for an inequitable purpose.”
Consistent with corporate law’s traditional approach, evidence of good
faith and reasonable investigation is “materially enhanced . . . by the ap-
proval of a board comprised of a majority of outside independent direc-
tors.”  Under the second prong, the board must demonstrate that the
measure was “reasonable in relation to the threat posed.”
Id. (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955).
73. 5 A.3d 586 (Del. 2010).
74. Id. at 601 (quoting Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp. (In re Unitrin, Inc.
S’holders Litig.), 651 A.2d 1361, 1387 (Del. 1995)) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Kahan & Rock, supra note 36, at 724 (noting that “a response is
‘coercive’ if it is aimed at forcing on stockholders a management-sponsored alter-
native to a hostile offer”).
75. Versata Enters. Inc., 5 A.3d at 601 (quoting Carmody v. Toll Bros. Inc., 723
A.2d 1180, 1195 (Del. Ch. 1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
76. Kahan & Rock, supra note 36, at 724 (citing Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1387).
77. Paul H. Edelman & Randall S. Thomas, Selectica Resets the Trigger on the
Poison Pill: Where Should the Delaware Courts Go Next?, 87 IND. L.J. 1087, 1111 (2012).
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Without chasing the rabbit down the hole that is the Delaware Su-
preme Court majority opinion in Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc.,78 a
decision that stands on uncertain ground79 and, when decided, was la-
beled as having “the life expectancy of a fruit fly[,]”80 the holding none-
theless “properly separated the elements of coercion and preclusion from
the question of overarching reasonableness.”81  That is to say, “[t]he issues
of coercion and preclusion are separate from and logically prior to an
assessment of reasonableness,”82 in that the question of whether a defen-
sive board action was within the applicable range of reasonableness may
only properly be asked once defendant directors have shown that the mea-
sures taken were not “draconian.”83  Delaware courts, in evaluating the
reasonableness of a decision, “should be deciding whether the directors
made a reasonable decision, not a perfect decision. . . .  Thus, courts will not
substitute their business judgment for that of the directors, but will deter-
mine if the directors’ decision was, on balance, within a range of reasona-
bleness.”84  Accordingly, the “range of reasonableness” standard is a
“relatively permissive” one,85 such that the reasonableness inquiry is fact-
specific and therefore conducive to being molded to fit the mission-based
objectives of public benefit corporations, recognizing simultaneously that
78. 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003).
79. See Sean J. Griffith, The Costs and Benefits of Precommitment: An Appraisal of
Omnicare v. NCS Healthcare, 29 J. CORP. L. 569, 623 (2004); Wayne O. Hanewicz,
Director Primacy, Omnicare, and the Function of Corporate Law, 71 TENN. L. REV. 511,
556–58 (2004); Kahan & Rock, supra note 36, at 730; J. Travis Laster, Omnicare’s
Silver Lining, 38 J. CORP. L. 795, 795 n.2 (2013) (citing Andrew D. Arons, In Defense
of Defensive Devices: How Delaware Discouraged Preventative Measures in Omnicare v.
NCS Healthcare, 3 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 105, 120–21 (2004)); E. Norman Vea-
sey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in Delaware Corporate Law and Gov-
ernance from 1992–2004? A Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REV.
1399, 1461 (2005); Eleonora Gerasimchuk, Article, Stretching the Limits of Deal Pro-
tection Devices: From Omnicare to Wachovia, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 685, 704
(2010); Thanos Panagopoulos, Article, Thinking Inside the Box: Analyzing Judicial
Scrutiny of Deal Protection Devices in Delaware, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 437, 466–68
(2006); Daniel Vinish, Comment, The Demise of Clarity in Corporate Takeover Jurispru-
dence: The Omnicare v. NCS Healthcare Anomaly, 21 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT.
311, 312 (2006).
80. Laster, supra note 79, at 796 n.3 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(“Then-Justice, now Chief Justice Steele was quoted as saying during a discussion of
the case at a continuing legal education event that ‘[w]hile I don’t suggest that you
rip the Omnicare pages out of your notebook. . . .  I do suggest that there’s the
possibility, one could argue, that the decision has the life expectancy of a fruit
fly.’” (alterations in original)).
81. Id. at 796.
82. Id. at 812.
83. See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp. (In re Unitrin, Inc. S’holders Litig.),
651 A.2d 1361, 1383 (Del. 1995).
84. Id. at 1385–86 (quoting Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc.,
637 A.2d 34, 45–46 (Del. 1994)).
85. Kahan & Rock, supra note 36, at 724 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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cognizable threats at social enterprises may diverge from those faced by
their traditional, for-profit counterparts.86
With respect to public benefit corporations, the Delaware courts are
likely to be compelled to continue to rely on “ad hoc discussions”87 tai-
lored to the social and environmental objectives of mission-driven entities
and the measures taken in defense of those objectives.  The decision to
stick to its mission in the face of an attractive offer certainly presents the
possibility of directors forcing a management-sponsored alternative on
shareholders, who may favor a bidder’s substitute roadmap for the produc-
tion of social value or, despite their investment in a social enterprise, may
be seeking increased wealth.  Comparably, given the paucity of hostile
transactions in the social enterprise realm, it is currently unclear whether
successful proxy contests and changes of control are realistically attainable
when defending public benefit corporation boards adopt traditional de-
fensive measures to supplement their ability to “say no” using benefit pur-
pose as a justification.
The mixture formed by adopted defensive measures and the ability to
“say no” for mission-based reasons presumably makes obtaining control
challenging and, at times, difficult to realistically achieve, in light of the
undefined liberty granted by the balancing requirements of Section
365(a).  In the Unocal context, concerns of preclusivity and coerciveness at
public benefit corporations arise where a bidder submits an offer for the
company and the target board adopts defensive measures to deter the un-
wanted suitor88 and where a public benefit corporation maintains defen-
sive measures it adopted prior to the arrival of a bidder.89  In both
scenarios, bidders seeking to acquire target public benefit corporations
are faced with significant challenges that require financial, social, and en-
vironmental resources to overcome, so as to satisfy impact investor inter-
ests and social enterprise leadership’s corresponding accountability to
those concerns.90
As to the third scenario typically triggering the Unocal standard of re-
view, where a corporation implements deal protection mechanisms to pre-
serve an agreed-upon transaction from the threat of an unwanted
interloper,91 it is well-settled in Delaware law that independent and disin-
terested selling boards are “not absolutely required to treat all bidders
86. See Alexander et al., supra note 20, at 272 (stating that “what might not
constitute a cognizable threat to a traditional, for-profit corporation might well
constitute such a threat to a [public benefit corporation]”).
87. Edelman & Thomas, supra note 77, at 1111.
88. See generally Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del.
1985).
89. See generally Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc. (In re Airgas Inc.
S’holder Litig.), 16 A.3d 48 (Del. Ch. 2011).
90. See Strine, Making It Easier, supra note 20, at 248 (citing DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 362(a) (2013)).
91. See generally Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc. (In re Time Inc.
S’holder Litig.), 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
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equally.”92  Therefore, boards are generally free to provide some acquirers
with advantages not otherwise available to others in the same contem-
plated transaction.93  In attempting to navigate the omnipresent specter of
entrenchment, defendant directors at public benefit corporations will be
especially challenged in attempting to justify their defensive actions in
favor of one transaction at the expense of another, where the measure
taken does not “reflect a good faith effort to secure a better price for
shareholders” on its face,94 but instead is taken in furtherance of the com-
pany’s benefit purposes.
The Delaware courts, applying the Unocal standard of review to public
benefit corporations, will be faced with the difficult task of deciphering
deal protection mechanisms adopted by management to defend against a
threat posed to the company’s social mission by an interloping acquirer
that is perhaps offering a financially more attractive deal, but that has an
eye towards undermining the target’s public benefit commitment, either
wholly or in part.  The Delaware judiciary’s unwillingness to insert itself
into the rational business decisions of directors will likely be magnified
when considering how such decisions relate to a social enterprise’s public
benefit objectives.95  Certainly, in order to fairly evaluate whether a deal
protection mechanism is preclusive, coercive, and within a range of rea-
sonableness, the analytical process for the judiciary will likely be required
to evolve to more aptly reflect the novel purposes of public benefit
corporations.96
92. In re Novell, Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 6032–VCN, 2013 WL 322560, at *9
(Del. Ch. Jan. 3, 2013) (citing In re Fort Howard Corp. S’holder Litig., No. 9991,
1988 WL 83147, at *14 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 1988)); see also In re Novell, Inc. S’holder
Litig., No. 6032–VCN, 2014 WL 6686785, at *9 (Del. Ch. Nov. 25, 2014).
93. See In re Novell, 2013 WL 322560, at *9; In re Novell,  2014 WL 6686785, at
*9.
94. See Ronald J. Gilson, Lipton and Rowe’s Apologia for Delaware: A Short Reply,
27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 37, 40–41 (2002) (“Target management’s efforts to block a
takeover may reflect a good faith effort to secure a better price for shareholders, or
it may reflect entrenchment—a preference of target management to maintain the
status quo.”); Griffith, supra note 79, at 582 n.70 (“discussing cases where the direc-
tors have no direct pecuniary interest in the transaction but have an entrenchment
interest, i.e., an interest in protecting their existing control of the corporation and
noting that the corporation law has always been concerned . . . with whether direc-
tors have acted to advance their personal self-interest by entrenching themselves in
office” (alteration in original) (quoting William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E.
Strine, Jr., Function over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corpo-
ration Law, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 859, 862–63 (2001)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
95. See Alexander et al., supra note 20, at 273.
96. Dealmakers have adapted to perceived missteps by the Delaware judiciary
with respect to the import of Omnicare on deal protection mechanisms. See E. Nor-
man Veasey, Ten Years After Omnicare: The Evolving Market for Deal Protection Devices,
38 J. CORP. L. 891, 901–02 (2013) (concluding “[i]n short, there are reasons to
question the enduring jurisprudence of Omnicare.  But of greater importance is the
fact there are many variations of deal protections and ways to obviate Omnicare.
Dealmakers are fashioning these measures every day.  In practice, therefore, Omni-
14
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Hostile bidders faced with the reality that directors at public benefit
corporations can reasonably reject an offer for the company on the
grounds that it would lead to mission-drift, depriving shareholders of so-
cial value, face a meaningful, yet outwardly surmountable obstacle in ac-
quiring such entities.  As mentioned above, “in the setting of a traditional,
for-profit corporation, courts will uphold a non-preclusive deal protection
measure if it is demonstrated to be within a ‘range of reasonableness.’
The standard is fairly deferential, but one could well ask if it would be
even looser in the case of a [public benefit corporation].”97
The interplay between the perceived “looser” standard—the ability to
“say no” in an effort to stick to mission—and the threat of adopting or
maintaining defensive measures makes obtaining control of an unrecep-
tive public benefit corporation an exacting undertaking.  Accordingly, a
Delaware court reviewing the propriety of a public benefit corporation’s
decisions to both reject an offer on the grounds that it would result in
mission-drift and maintain or adopt defensive measures to thwart the same
offer would struggle to do so, as “[t]he weight to be given to other constit-
uencies would seem to be a matter entrusted to the judgment of the direc-
tors . . . and would be difficult for courts to second guess.”98
From a cynic’s perspective, the latitude afforded to directors at public
benefit corporations with respect to their ability to direct and manage the
affairs of the company in a manner that considers the enterprise’s stated
public benefit purposes,99 particularly when considering their authority to
adopt defensive measures, suggests that management may be able to de-
prive shareholders of a market opportunity under the guise of adhering to
mission while, seemingly acting within a permissible range of reasonable-
ness.  Given the difficulty courts may have evaluating the business pur-
poses of decisions in furtherance of social mission,100 public benefit
corporation directors are in a prime position to “green-wash[ ]” their deci-
sions to further their self-interest and impose greater acquisition hurdles
on acquirers that may be offering valuable social, environmental, and fi-
nancial returns to investors.101  Indeed, Delaware courts have long “recog-
nized that directors are often confronted with an ‘inherent conflict of
interest’ during contests for corporate control ‘[b]ecause of the omnipres-
ent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather
than those of the corporation and its shareholders.’”102
care may have set forth some doctrinal landmarks, but it should not present too
many obstacles for dealmakers.”).
97. Alexander et al., supra note 20, at 273 (footnotes omitted).
98. Strine, Our Continuing Struggle, supra note 2, at 150 n.45.
99. See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365(a) (2015).
100. See Strine, Our Continuing Struggle, supra note 2, at 150 n.45.
101. See Strine, Making It Easier, supra note 20, at 249.
102. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp. (In re Unitrin, Inc. S’holders Litig.), 651
A.2d 1361, 1373 (Del. 1995) (alteration in original) (quoting Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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The foundational question, ultimately, is
whether the deferential standard of [S]ection 365(b), which pro-
vides that directors are deemed to have satisfied their “fiduciary
duties to stockholders and the corporation” as long as their deci-
sions were “both informed and disinterested and not such that
no person of ordinary, sound judgment would approve” applies
“to a decision implicating the balance requirement” among
stockholders and public beneficiaries.103
That is to say, query whether directors will comfortably survive the
threshold judicial examination of the subjective and objective review of
the process used to adopt a defense mechanism104 and enjoy the protec-
tions of the business judgment rule when deploying benefit purpose as a
justification for a respective determination to turn away an unwanted
acquirer.
A. The Stockholders’ Role in the Strained Relationship Between Delaware Public
Benefit Corporations and M&A
Delaware’s public benefit corporation statute was codified in July
2013, with its most consequential provision being the balancing require-
ment in Section 365(a).105  Outside of maintaining differentiated fiduci-
ary mandates for directors, public benefit corporations are required to
“produce a public benefit or public benefits and to operate in a responsi-
ble and sustainable manner.”106  The importance of a public benefit cor-
poration’s mission, within the merger and acquisition context, is reflected
by the language in Section 363(c), which provides:
103. Alexander et al., supra note 20, at 272 (citing tit. 8, § 365(b)).  Section
365(b) provides:
A director of a public benefit corporation shall not, by virtue of the pub-
lic benefit provisions or § 362(a) of this title, have any duty to any person
on account of any interest of such person in the public benefit or public
benefits identified in the certificate of incorporation or on account of any
interest materially affected by the corporation’s conduct and, with re-
spect to a decision implicating the balance requirement in subsection (a)
of this section, will be deemed to satisfy such director’s fiduciary duties to
stockholders and the corporation if such director’s decision is both in-
formed and disinterested and not such that no person of ordinary, sound
judgment would approve.
tit. 8, § 365(b).
104. See Siegel, supra note 39, at 609.
105. See tit. 8, § 365(a).  Section 365(a) requires:
The board of directors shall manage or direct the business and affairs of
the public benefit corporation in a manner that balances the pecuniary
interests of the stockholders, the best interests of those materially affected
by the corporation’s conduct, and the specific public benefit or public
benefits identified in its certificate of incorporation.
Id.
106. Id. § 362(a).
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[A] corporation that is a public benefit corporation may not,
without the approval of 2/3 of the outstanding stock of each class
of the stock of the corporation entitled to vote thereon: . . . (2)
Merge or consolidate with or into another entity if, as a result of
such merger or consolidation, the shares in such corporation
would become, or be converted into or exchanged for the right
to receive, shares or other equity interests in a domestic or for-
eign corporation that is not a public benefit corporation or simi-
lar entity and the certificate of incorporation (or similar
governing instrument) of which does not contain the identical
provisions identifying the public benefit or public
benefits . . . .107
In effect, approval of a business combination with the potential to aban-
don a public benefit corporation’s mission requires supermajority ap-
proval of the outstanding shares of each class of the stock of the public
benefit corporation.  Needless to say, social impact shareholders, with in-
terests extending beyond financial remuneration, likely will not be quick
to accept consideration from an offeror keen to abandon the social and
environmental responsibility initiatives that invited their initial invest-
ments, as discussed infra.108
Shareholders of public benefit corporations are not the only owner-
ship group whose approval is required in a transaction involving a mission-
driven entity and a traditional, profit-maximizing corporation.  Pursuant
to Section 363(a):
[A] corporation that is not a public benefit corporation, may not,
without the approval of 2/3 of the outstanding stock of the cor-
poration entitled to vote thereon: . . . (2) Merge or consolidate
with or into another entity if, as a result of such merger or con-
solidation, the shares in such corporation would become, or be
converted into or exchanged for the right to receive, shares or
other equity interests in a domestic or foreign public benefit cor-
poration or similar entity.109
Reflective of Delaware’s continuous commitment to the shareholder
wealth maximization norm, Section 363(a)’s two-thirds approval require-
ment ensures that shareholders of a traditional wealth-maximizing corpo-
ration engaged in a business combination with a public benefit
corporation only receive equity interests in an enterprise that is oriented
towards producing social and environmental returns, even at the expense
107. Id. § 363(c) (emphasis added).
108. See Plerhoples, supra note 64, at 254 (“[T]he preferences of impact or
social investors differ from those of traditional profit-maximizing investors . . . .”).
109. tit. 8, § 363(a) (emphasis added).  Section 363(a) continues: “The re-
strictions of this section shall not apply prior to the time that the corporation has
received payment for any of its capital stock, or in the case of a nonstock corpora-
tion, prior to the time that it has members.” Id.
17
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of profit maximization, when essentially all of the shareholder population
has consented.
The statutory protection provided by the supermajority provisions in
Section 363 is not unique to the Delaware General Corporation Law, how-
ever.  “Most benefit corporation statutes require an affirmative vote of at
least two-thirds of the shareholders to adopt or terminate benefit corpora-
tion status.”110  Of course, when a public benefit corporation engages in a
merger or acquisition with a traditional profit-maximizing corporation,
there is potential on both sides of the transaction, depending on its struc-
ture, for the abandonment or adoption of a public benefit mission.  In
either scenario, there is a threat to the foundational principles of each of
the Delaware entities: in the case of a public benefit corporation, the ter-
mination of benefit purpose; or, where a traditional corporation stands to
have its shares converted into or exchanged for public benefit corporation
shares, the desertion of the shareholder wealth maximization norm.
The two-thirds approval threshold in Section 363(a) is an endorse-
ment of the potential operational and financial divide between public ben-
efit corporations and traditional business corporations.  Moreover, the
Delaware statutory amendments reinforce the sanctity of the shareholder
wealth-maximization creed by reaffirming that appraisal rights are availa-
ble to stockholders of a corporation that is not a public benefit corpora-
tion “immediately prior to the effective time of . . . [a] merger or
consolidation that would result in the conversion of the corporation’s
stock into or exchange of the corporation’s stock for the right to receive
shares or other equity interests in” a public benefit corporation or similar
entity, provided that such holder has neither voted in favor of or con-
sented to such merger or consolidation.111  To be sure, shareholders of
traditional corporations will be quick to exercise their appraisal rights in a
transaction involving a public benefit corporation, if “the corporate law
requires directors, as a matter of their duty of loyalty, to pursue a good
faith strategy to maximize profits for the stockholders.”112
The consequence of the significantly high approval requirements that
accompany Section 363 is that mergers and acquisitions involving Dela-
ware public benefit corporations are conceivably difficult to consum-
110. J. Haskell Murray, Defending Patagonia: Mergers and Acquisitions with Benefit
Corporations, 9 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 485, 494, 508 (2013) [hereinafter Murray, Defend-
ing Patagonia] (citing MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION §§ 102(a), 201(a)); J.
HASKELL MURRAY, BENEFIT CORPORATIONS: STATE STATUTE COMPARISON CHART
(Dec. 6, 2012), updated version sub nom. CORPORATE FORMS OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISE,
COMPARING THE STATE STATUTES (Jan. 15, 2015), available at https://www.law.u
mich.edu/clinical/internationaltransactionclinic/Documents/May%2011%20Con
ference%20Docs/Corporate%20Forms%20of%20Social%20Enterprise.pdf.
[https://perma.cc/HWC7-PXG8?type=source])
111. See tit. 8, § 363(b).
112. Lyman Johnson, Pluralism in Corporate Form: Corporate Law and Benefit
Corps., 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 269, 284 (2013) (quoting Strine, Our Continuing Strug-
gle, supra note 2, at 155) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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mate,113 regardless of whether the social enterprise assumes the role of
target or acquirer.  Supermajority approval of a sale or business combina-
tion “provide[s] another hurdle” for public benefit corporations that wish
to “leave their mission behind” in connection with a transaction.114  How-
ever, the threshold requirements not only create additional impediments
for public benefit corporations seeking to be acquired by a traditional cor-
poration, but also pose additional challenges for management of Dela-
ware-based socially responsible businesses seeking to acquire a profit-
maximizing entity.115
In the infancy of the statutory amendments, when many of the public
benefit corporations conducting business “remain closely held by a cohe-
sive group of like-minded stockholders with similar preferences regarding
the balance between pecuniary gain and the corporation’s stated public
purpose,” the challenge posed by Section 363’s respective approval thresh-
olds is perhaps less unnerving.116  However, once the shareholder popula-
tion in public benefit corporations becomes more widely-held, diverse,
and complicated, as it inevitably will, obtaining the supermajority approval
of social impact investors evolves into a task not-so-easily fulfilled.117
B. Poison Puts: The Perceived Availability of Toxic Debt
at Public Benefit Corporations
Currently, a substantial portion of public benefit corporations are
new companies with limited operating histories and few shareholders, as
mentioned above.118  Capitalization challenges at new companies are not
uncommon, and management often seeks recourse in the debt capital
113. See Alexander et al., supra note 20, at 279 (“If and when the ranks of
[public benefit corporations] become populated with more widely-held firms with
disaggregated stockholders [ ] courts [will] likely [ ] address the . . .  challenges
[facing] merger and acquisition transactions involving [public benefit
corporations].”).
114. Murray, Defending Patagonia, supra note 110, at 512.
115. See id.
116. Alexander et al., supra note 20, at 279.
117. See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp. (In re Unitrin, Inc. S’holders Litig.),
651 A.2d 1361, 1381 (Del. 1995) (citing Berlin v. Emerald Partners, 552 A.2d 482
(Del. 1989)); see also Strine, Making It Easier, supra note 20, at 247.  Chief Justice
Strine notes:
These voting requirements could be outcome-determinative in real
world situations.  Attaining a vote of two-thirds of the outstanding shares
is likely to prove difficult, even in a vote on a merger or acquisition.
Given the velocity of trading, an increasing number of shares are simply
not voted by stockholders because so many trades are made after the re-
cord date.  Because of that reality and the need to obtain two-thirds of all
shares that could be voted, leverage will be granted to any base of socially
responsible investment funds, individual investors, and manager- and em-
ployee-stockholders committed to protecting the public benefits the cor-
poration was established to serve.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
118. See generally Strine, Making It Easier, supra note 20.
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markets.  “To date, the vast majority of social enterprises have been closely-
held, and only a few have attracted outside capital, which is often needed
to scale business operations.”119  The ability to borrow money is not only
useful in the scaling process, but it is also a meaningful shield against hos-
tile takeovers, particularly in the “poison put” context.  A company utiliz-
ing a poison put will “enter into a loan agreement” and borrow capital
from a lender.120  In colloquial terms, the loan agreement “specif[ies] that
if there is a change of control at the [borrower], the debt must be bought
back.”121  The defensive aspect of such a provision
is that the debt is often required to be bought back at a pre-
mium, or the company will be in a market where refinancing it is
hard.  In an extreme situation, the company may not be able to
refinance its debt or have the cash to buy back the debt, leaving it
effectively bankrupt.122
The consequence of these accelerated, premium buy-back event risk cove-
nants, therefore, is that target companies with poison put provisions in
their loan agreements are “more expensive to take over, or in some cir-
cumstances, impossible to be bought out because of the costs of the
poison put.”123
The Delaware courts have questioned the permissibility of event risk
covenants requiring the accelerated payment of debt at a premium.124
The Court of Chancery, in Kallick v. Sandridge Energy,125 noted its hope
that directors—aware of the “toll” that poison puts can take on the share-
holder franchise—would “only accede” to such a provision in their loan
agreements after “hard negotiation and only for clear economic advan-
119. Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation, supra note 7, at 367 (citing Joan Mac-
Leod Heminway, To Be or Not to Be (A Security): Funding For-Profit Social Enterprises, 25
REGENT U. L. REV. 299, 308–09 (2013)).
120. Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Defense Against Hostile Takeovers Develops a
Downside, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2014, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/11/25/a-
defense-against-hostile-takeovers-develops-a-downside/?_[https://perma.cc/F27P-
W792?type=image].
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.; see also Douglas O. Cook & John C. Easterwood, Poison Put Bonds: An
Analysis of Their Economic Role, 49 J. FIN. 1905, 1906 (1994).
124. See Solomon, supra note 120 (citing Pontiac Gen. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Bal-
lantine, No. 9789–VCL, 2014 WL 6388645 (Del. Ch. Oct. 14, 2014); Kallick v. Sand-
ridge Energy, Inc., 68 A.3d 242 (Del. Ch. 2013); San Antonio Fire & Police Pension
Fund v. Amylin Pharms., Inc., 983 A.2d 304 (Del. Ch.), aff’d, 981 A.2d 1173 (Del.
2009)).  In Sandridge Energy, the poison put—referenced therein as a “Proxy Put”—
in the indentures at issue compelled the incumbent board to warn that Sandridge
Energy “may not have sufficient liquidity to fund the purchase price for such senior notes as
required under the Indentures . . . [and] [a] mandatory refinancing of this magnitude would
present an extreme, risky and unnecessary financial burden . . . .” See Sandridge Energy, 68
A.3d at 250 (third alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
125. 68 A.3d 242 (Del. Ch. 2013).
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tage.”126  Then-Vice Chancellor Lamb, in San Antonio Fire & Police Pension
Fund v. Amylin Pharmaceuticals,127 suggested that the Delaware courts
“would want, at a minimum, to see evidence that the board believed in
good faith that, in accepting [a poison put], it was obtaining in return
extraordinarily valuable economic benefits for the corporation that would
not otherwise be available to it.”128
Outside of the courtroom, poison put provisions have been referred
to as an “unregulable defense,” in view of the fact that “[m]anagers can
utilize these defenses to deter acquisitions or proxy contests, ‘embedding’
[them] within a host of seemingly ordinary, and otherwise legitimate, pre-
bid business transactions.”129  The decision to accept a poison put provi-
sion in a loan agreement is arguably “unregulable” because of the “unfet-
tered managerial freedom to adopt such defenses because they are
contractual rather than subject to shareholder vote, and because their pur-
poses may be difficult to pinpoint as purely entrenching and therefore
nefarious.”130  However, the policy justification behind such provisions—
that lenders should benefit from the comfort provided by being familiar
with the borrower on the other side of a loan agreement131—has pre-
served both the viability and prevalence132 of the controversial covenants.
In the Delaware public benefit corporation form’s infancy, debt may,
ultimately, function as the most effective source of financing for these new
entities, given the likely difficulty posed by obtaining “patient capital” that
is willing to “pursu[e] a nonfinancial purpose as well as some long-term
profit . . . .”133  The fear, of course, is that management will manipulate
event risk covenants, such that the “omnipresent specter” of entrench-
ment and decisions motivated by self-interest will overshadow the policy
justification promoting the use of such provisions.134  Nonetheless, man-
agement may seek to capture the lending opportunities provided by social
126. Id. at 248 (citing Amylin Pharms., Inc., 983 A.2d at 315).
127. 983 A.2d 304 (Del. Ch. 2009).
128. Id. at 315.
129. DAVID WHISSEL, PROXY MOSAIC, PERILOUS POISON PUTS: EMBEDDED ANTI-
TAKEOVER DEFENSES AND SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS 4 (2014) (second alteration in origi-
nal) (quoting Jennifer Arlen & Eric Talley, Unregulable Defenses and the Perils of
Shareholder Choice, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 577, 600 (2003)) (internal quotation marks
omitted), available at https://www.proxymosaic.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/
12/Proxy-Puts-White-Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/QSA2-J857].
130. Id. (citing Arlen & Talley, supra note 129, at 600).
131. See Solomon, supra note 120.
132. See id. (“S&P Capital IQ reports there are now more than 4,500 debt
instruments outstanding with poison put features.”).
133. Munch, supra note 6, at 173 (citing Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice of
Entity on the Social Enterprise Frontier, 84 TUL. L. REV. 337, 354–55 (2009)).
134. For a discussion of the “omnipresent specter of entrenchment,” see gen-
erally J. Travis Laster, Exorcizing the Omnipresent Specter: The Impact of Substantial Eq-
uity Ownership by Outside Directors on Unocal Analysis, 55 BUS. LAW. 109 (1999).
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impact creditors who seek to do well by doing good.135  Managers at mis-
sion-driven entities may also be impelled to accept less-favorable terms in
loan agreements, at least at the outset, given the novel nature of the Dela-
ware benefit corporation and the associated uncertainty that comes with
lending to companies with limited operating histories.  Social-impact in-
vestors, to date, have been the primary source for the influx of outside
capital into the for-profit social enterprise space.  Meanwhile, common fi-
nancing may be more difficult for public benefit corporations to obtain, as
“the mix of social and profit purposes may raise eyebrows” for “diligent
investors or lenders who closely examine the business plan of a social en-
trepreneur.”136  Indeed, “corporations pursuing social goals may have lim-
ited access to other non-equity sources of capital like bonds and loans.
Due to their more limited, less certain profitability, such corporations may
be subject to higher interest rates from lenders.”137
This is all to say that lenders, when negotiating loan agreements with
public benefit corporations, may desire to include an event risk cove-
nant—which would accelerate debt payments at a premium in the event
that there was a change of control at the social enterprise—given the in-
herent risks of financing public benefit corporations with debt.138  Man-
agement at public benefit corporations may, in turn, see this as an
opportunity to bolster its takeover defense arsenal and willingly accept
less-favorable provisions that have the effect of making the company more
difficult to acquire on a financial basis, despite being housed in ordinary
business transactions.
From a corporate governance perspective, managers at public benefit
corporations seemingly have a plausible and reasonable foundation for
accepting a provision that may have an “eviscerating effect on the [share-
holder] franchise,”139 given the company’s commitment to its social and
environmental initiatives and the prospective financing challenges that at-
tend the potential for diluted profitability as a result of those missions.140
Therefore, to the extent that the availability of capital for public benefit
corporations is in limited supply due to their undeveloped operating histo-
135. See generally Fact Sheet: The Utah High Quality Preschool Program, America’s
First Social Impact Bond Targeting Early Childhood Education, GOLDMAN SACHS, availa-
ble at http://www.goldmansachs.com/what-we-do/investing-and-lending/impact-
investing/case-studies/sib-slc-fact-sheet.pdf [http://perma.cc/9Y2S-PDC3].
136. Heminway, supra note 119, at 318 n.82 (quoting Dana Brakman Reiser,
Benefit Corporations—A Sustainable Form of Organization?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
591, 618 (2011)).
137. Munch, supra note 6, at 174 (footnote omitted) (citing Matthew F. Doer-
inger, Note, Fostering Social Enterprise: A Historical and International Analysis, 20 DUKE
J. COMP. & INT’L L. 291, 303 (2010)).
138. See Doeringer, supra note 137.
139. WHISSEL, supra note 129, at 6 (alteration in original) (quoting San
Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund v. Amylin Pharms., Inc., 983 A.2d 304, 315
(Del. Ch. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
140. See Munch, supra note 6, at 174.
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ries, capacity for limited profitability, and obligation to public purpose,
accepting less-favorable event risk covenants in loan agreements may be
necessary sacrifices in obtaining financing that affords the company “ex-
traordinarily valuable economic benefits . . . that would not otherwise be
available to it.”141
C. Classifying Public Benefit Corporation Boards
Classified boards are an effective142 and controversial method of
preventing hostile takeovers.143  Proponents of the classified board sug-
gest that its “primary effect” is “stability,” particularly when the company is
confronted by an unwanted suitor, as a result of the fact that a staggered
board requires a hostile bidder to “successfully gain election of its director
nominees” at multiple annual meetings of the target.144  Similarly, leader-
ship in favor of installing or maintaining a staggered board at their com-
pany often rely on the notion that such structures do “not preclude
unsolicited acquisition proposals but, by eliminating the threat of immi-
nent removal, puts the incumbent [b]oard in a position to act to maximize
value to all shareholders.”145  To this end, “academics have defended the
staggered board as a means to ensure director primacy, itself a social good.
Director primacy in its purist form posits that directors should have deci-
sion-making authority over shareholders.”146
On the other side of the coin, those who oppose classified boards
suggest that the “stability” offered by such structures is functionally “en-
trenchment,” disincentivizing underperforming directors to the detriment
of shareholders.147  Lucian Bebchuk, most notably, has been at the fore-
141. WHISSEL, supra note 129, at 6 (quoting Amylin Pharms., Inc., 983 A.2d at
315) (internal quotation marks omitted).
142. For a discussion of how a classified board operates, see generally Richard
H. Koppes, Lyle G. Ganske & Charles T. Haag, Corporate Governance Out of Focus:
The Debate over Classified Boards, 54 BUS. LAW. 1023 (1999).
143. See generally Lucian Bebchuk, Scott Hirst & June Rhee, Towards the Declas-
sification of S&P 500 Boards, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 157 (2013) [hereinafter Bebchuk
et al., Declassification] (arguing against use of classified boards); Koppes et al., supra
note 142 (arguing in favor of classified boards).
144. Koppes et al., supra note 142, at 1027.
145. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The
Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L.
REV. 887, 899 n.37, 901 (2002) [hereinafter Bebchuk et al., Staggered Boards] (quot-
ing Bausch & Lomb Proxy Statement, Shareholder Proposal No. 2 (Dec. 28, 1996))
(internal quotation marks omitted); id. (“[T]he threat of imminent removal, puts
the incumbent [b]oard in a position to act to maximize value to all shareholders.”
(quoting Bausch & Lomb Proxy Statement, Shareholder Proposal No. 2 (Mar. 19,
1998)).
146. Stephen M. Davidoff, A Case Study: Air Products v. Airgas and the Value of
Strategic Judicial Decision-Making, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 502, 511 (footnote omit-
ted) (citing Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers: Prelimi-
nary Reflections, 55 STAN. L. REV. 791, 807–09 (2002)).
147. Koppes et al., supra note 142, at 1027 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted); id. at 1027 n. 14 (“Whether one perceives the classified board structure to
23
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front of the movement to declassify boards, citing to his belief that “signifi-
cant shareholder support for declassification proposals is consistent with
empirical studies reporting that classified boards are associated with lower
firm value and inferior outcomes for shareholders.”148  Shareholder sup-
port for declassification has admittedly rendered staggered boards an en-
dangered species, with classification provisions rapidly declining in
utilization over the past two decades such that their reproduction in the
socially responsible business context is potentially implausible.149
The newly adopted provisions of the Delaware General Corporation
Law, Sections 361–368, calling for the incorporation of public benefit cor-
porations, do not impose requirements differing from those applicable to
traditional, for-profit entities under the statute with respect to board struc-
tures.  Section 141(d) of the DGCL provides the authority, in part, for
staggering a corporation’s board.150  The Section also permits classifica-
tion of a corporation’s board via a shareholder bylaw,151 effectively dilut-
ing its anti-takeover import, as a result of the ease with which the board
may be declassified.  The court in Airgas, Inc. v. Air Products and Chemicals,
Inc. noted that:
To implement a staggered board, as permitted by DGCL Section
141, corporations typically have used two forms of language.
Many corporations provide in their charters that each class of di-
rectors serves until the “annual meeting of stockholders to be
held in the third year following the year of their election.” . . .
have a positive or negative effect on shareholder wealth depends upon whether
one believes that classified boards promote stability or entrenchment.” (quoting
Jason D. Montgomery, Classified Boards, CORP. GOVERNANCE SERVS., IRRC, Mar. 3,
1998, at 2) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
148. Bebchuk et al, Declassification, supra note 143, at 164; see also Bebchuk et
al., Staggered Boards, supra note 145, at 900 (discussing growing opposition to stag-
gered boards).
149. See Bebchuk et al., Declassification, supra note 143, at 165–66 (“According
to data from FactSet Research Systems, there were 303 S&P 500 companies with
classified boards at the beginning of 1999, and that number declined to 126 at the
beginning of 2012.  That is, during this twelve-year period, the fraction of S&P 500
companies with classified boards declined by about 60%.” (footnote omitted)).
150. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (2014).
151. See id.  Section 141(d) provides:
The directors of any corporation organized under this chapter may, by
the certificate of incorporation or by an initial bylaw, or by a bylaw
adopted by a vote of the stockholders, be divided into 1, 2 or 3 classes; the
term of office of those of the first class to expire at the first annual meet-
ing held after such classification becomes effective; of the second class 1
year thereafter; of the third class 2 years thereafter; and at each annual
election held after such classification becomes effective, directors shall be
chosen for a full term, as the case may be, to succeed those whose terms
expire.
Id.
24
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On the other hand, some corporations . . . provide in their char-
ters that each class serves for a “term of three years.”152
However, where the staggered board is integrated in the company’s char-
ter pursuant to Section 242, declassification of a staggered board requires
both shareholder approval and board recommendation, solidifying it as
the more difficult provision for a hostile acquirer to overcome.153
The consequence of classified boards at Delaware public benefit cor-
porations is three-fold. First, as at a traditional corporation, “[a] classified
board would delay—but not prevent—a hostile acquirer from obtaining control of
the board, since a determined acquirer could wage a proxy contest and ob-
tain control of two thirds of the target board over a two year period, as
opposed to seizing control in a single election.”154  Second, it forces a
hostile acquirer to confront the target company’s commitment to public
benefit in multiple election years, compounding the defensive impact of
the directors’ mandate to balance the public benefit purposes of the cor-
poration.  That is to say, because a hostile bidder is required to win multi-
ple elections in order to gain control of a staggered board, on more than
one occasion it must convince social impact shareholders, with interests
extrinsic to wealth maximization, that the bidder’s vision for the company
will bring increased social, environmental, and financial value.  This multi-
year endeavor is complicated by Section 366(b)’s requirement that the
board “no less than biennially” promulgate for the stockholders’ review “a
statement as to the corporation’s promotion of the public benefit or pub-
lic benefits identified in the certificate of incorporation and of the best
interests of those materially affected by the corporation’s conduct.”155
152. 8 A.3d 1182, 1188 (Del. 2010) (citing Essential Enters. v. Automatic Steel
Prods., Inc., 159 A.2d 288 (Del. Ch. 1960)).
153. See tit. 8, § 242; see also William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine,
Jr., The Great Takeover Debate: A Meditation on Bridging the Conceptual Divide, 69 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1067, 1088 (2002).
[A]dvocates would have the courts require the board to redeem the
poison pill once the proponents of a tender offer have won any election
focused on the offer, even if the election only replaces a minority of the
board.  The problem with this approach is that it puts a court in the posi-
tion of overriding a board majority, when the presence in the certificate
of the classified board structure itself represents a statutorily authorized
expression that stockholders may be forbidden from changing the com-
pany’s strategy in a single election.
Id. (footnote omitted).
154. Airgas, Inc., 8 A.3d at 1191 n.18 (quoting Versata Enters., Inc. v. Selec-
tica, Inc. 5 A.3d 586, 604 (Del. 2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
155. tit. 8, § 366(b).  In substance, Section 366(b) provides:
A public benefit corporation shall no less than biennially provide its
stockholders with a statement as to the corporation’s promotion of the
public benefit or public benefits identified in the certificate of incorpora-
tion and of the best interests of those materially affected by the corpora-
tion’s conduct.  The statement shall include:
(1) The objectives the board of directors has established to promote
such public benefit or public benefits and interests;
25
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Among other things, the Section 366 statement must set forth “[t]he
objectives the board of directors has established to promote such public
benefit or public benefits and interests.”156  Third, a classified board af-
fords incumbent board members negotiating leverage in the boardroom
and at the acquisition table in attempting to safeguard the pecuniary inter-
ests of the stockholders, the best interests of those materially affected by
the corporation’s conduct, and the specific public benefit or public bene-
fits identified in the company’s certificate of incorporation.157
D. Socially Responsible White Knights and the Corresponding
Revlon Uncertainty
As Delaware public benefit corporations establish themselves as a sus-
tainable form of enterprise, they will likely become more attractive targets
than they already are, especially for companies seeking to immediately im-
merse themselves in the mission-driven entity market and piggyback off of
the cemented “legitimacy of [a] target social enterprise.”158  The allure of
public benefit corporations will likely grow should the suggestion “that the
financial success of a social enterprise [is] [ ] because of—and not in spite
of—its social and environmental mission” prove to be economic actual-
ity.159  To the extent that bidders seek “access to a new and growing mar-
ket of socially responsible business” and public benefit corporations
(2) The standards the board of directors has adopted to measure
the corporation’s progress in promoting such public benefit or pub-
lic benefits and interests;
(3) Objective factual information based on those standards regard-
ing the corporation’s success in meeting the objectives for promot-
ing such public benefit or public benefits and interests; and
(4) An assessment of the corporation’s success in meeting the objec-
tives and promoting such public benefit or public benefits and
interests.
Id.  Additionally, Section 366(c) provides:
The certificate of incorporation or bylaws of a public benefit corporation
may require that the corporation:
(1) Provide the statement described in subsection (b) of this section
more frequently than biennially;
(2) Make the statement described in subsection (b) of this section
available to the public; and/or
(3) Use a third-party standard in connection with and/or attain a
periodic third-party certification addressing the corporation’s pro-
motion of the public benefit or public benefits identified in the cer-
tificate of incorporation and/or the best interests of those materially
affected by the corporation’s conduct.
Id.
156. Id. § 366(b)(1).
157. See Allen et al., supra note 153, at 1095 n.85.
158. Plerhoples, supra note 64, at 235 (observing that acquisition of benefit
corporation by traditional profit-maximizing corporation “leads to an immediate
immersion in the [social enterprise] market, marked by the legitimacy of the tar-
get social enterprise”).
159. Id. at 235.
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become attractive targets, acquisition trends suggest that “[o]nce a merger
is announced, other companies within the industry are likely to make their
own offers in order to remain competitive.”160
If a target public benefit corporation is subject to an unwanted offer,
finding friendlier acquisition companions seeking entry into the for-profit
social enterprise space likely will not be a far-fetched defensive strategy, in
view of the emerging nature of the socially responsible business market
and the desire for companies to remain competitive.161  Consequently,
employing a “white knight” defensive strategy at a public benefit corpora-
tion will, in all likelihood, become a viable and attractive defensive mea-
sure when faced with an offer from a hostile bidder.
White knight acquirers are bidders “seen as friendlier by the manage-
ment of a target company than the unsolicited outside bidder.”162  The
perception of one acquirer being friendlier than another stems in part
from the notion that the white knight, while interested in acquiring the
target company, may not be interested in controlling it, which enables tar-
get management to maintain the path set by its vision for the business of
the company.  That is, for public benefit corporations, a white knight may
not only be an acquirer uninterested in control, but one willing to support
and continue the target’s chosen path for its public benefit purposes.
The challenge posed to public benefit corporations that choose to
pursue a white knight defensive strategy, however, is the Delaware Su-
preme Court’s holding in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,
Inc.163  The duties of directors at public benefit corporations when selling
the company are ambiguous, in view of Section 365(a)’s uncertain balanc-
ing requirement and overarching language.164  To the extent that direc-
tors at a public benefit corporation sought a white knight to acquire the
company instead of a hostile bidder, such action would fall firmly within
160. See id. at 235–36 (“As markets become dominated by fewer and fewer
companies, these companies that fail to grow not only may wind up less competi-
tive on a global scale and unprepared to deal with changing technologies or de-
velop new ones, but also may find their strategic options limited if they miss the
opportunity to gain a significant market share by merging with a preferred part-
ner.”); see also Dennis J. Block, Public Company M&A: Directors’ Fiduciary Duties and
Recent Developments in Corporate Control Transactions, in CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE
CONTROL 2009: CURRENT OFFENSIVE & DEFENSIVE STRATEGIES IN M&A TRANSAC-
TIONS 9, 20 (2009).
161. See Block, supra note 160.
162. Melissa J. Rhodes, Note, The White Knight Privilege in Litigated Takeovers:
Leveling the Playing Field in Discovery, 43 STAN. L. REV. 445, 445 n.1 (1991) (“A white
knight is a ‘friendly’ company that will take over the target, theoretically on more
favorable terms than those offered by the raider, while usually retaining current
management.” (quoting Mark L. Berman, SEC Takeover Regulation Under the Wil-
liams Act, Note, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 580, 598 n.130 (1987)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
163. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
164. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365(a) (2013); Alexander et al., supra note
20, at 263; Strine, Making It Easier, supra note 20, at 246; Brownridge, supra note 20,
at 715.
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the grasp of the Revlon doctrine, as the heightened standard of review165 is
triggered “when a corporation initiates an active bidding process seeking
to sell itself . . . .”166 Consequently, while seeking a white knight when
subjected to overtures from a hostile bidder might otherwise be a viable
defensive measure, the directorships of public benefit corporations are in-
hibited by Section 365(a)’s lack of clarity, yielding a scenario whereby the
mandate of directors with respect to the weight to be ascribed to the pecu-
niary interests of the stockholders, the best interests of those materially
affected by the corporation’s conduct, and the specific public benefit or
benefits167 is unsettled.
E. Public Benefit Corporation Poison Pills
Prior to the arrival of Martin Lipton’s shareholder rights plan on the
takeover scene in the summer of 1982,168 “target managers resorted to a
variety of exotic sounding defensive tactics, ranging from ‘shark repel-
lants’ to ‘greenmail,’ and from ‘white knights’ to the ‘Pac-Man’ de-
fense.”169  The poison pill, however, reshaped the takeover landscape and
provided managers with a defensive mechanism superior to these color-
fully-named but less-effective measures:
A pill could be adopted by any company at any time without
shareholder approval; adoption of a pill did not entail significant
transaction costs and did not, apart from its effect on takeovers,
affect the conduct of the company’s business; and, most impor-
tantly, a pill made a company takeover-proof unless redeemed by
the target board.170
Opponents of the pill “paraded” academics and “experts” into the Dela-
ware courts to challenge the propriety of the shareholder rights plan,171
165. See J. Travis Laster, Revlon Is a Standard of Review: Why It’s True and What
It Means, 19 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 5, 6 (2013).
166. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc. (In re Time Inc. S’holder Litig.),
571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989) (citing Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc.,
559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1988)).
167. See tit. 8, § 365(a).
168. Martin Lipton, Pills, Polls, and Professors Redux, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037,
1037 (2002).
169. Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love
the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 875 (2002) (foot-
notes omitted); see also Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506
A.2d 173, 183 (Del. 1985) (discussing “white knight[s]”); RONALD J. GILSON & BER-
NARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 771–72 (2d ed.
1995) (discussing “Pac-Man” defense); Ronald J. Gilson, The Case Against Shark Re-
pellent Amendments: Structural Limitations on the Enabling Concept, 34 STAN. L. REV.
775, 777 (1982) (defining “shark repellants”); Jonathan R. Macey & Fred S.
McChesney, A Theoretical Analysis of Corporate Greenmail, 95 YALE L.J. 13, 13 (1985)
(defining “greenmail”).
170. Kahan & Rock, supra note 169, at 875 (footnote omitted).
171. See Lipton, supra note 168, at 1047.
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only to have their “strong academic arguments and political efforts . . . to
dramatically repudiate pills and other structural defenses” rebuffed by the
justices and chancellors.172  Even though questions swirled around the
permissibility of the rights plan, “[b]ecause any company could quickly
create a poison pill and because a pill was so effective, the doctrinal and
academic interest soon turned to the circumstances in which target man-
agers could refuse to redeem the pill . . . .”173  With the codification of the
Delaware public benefit corporation, the circumstances affording direc-
tors the discretion to refuse to redeem a shareholder rights plan are once
again in question.
Typically, poison pills permit directors to issue rights to existing
shareholders of a target company at a discount.  Those existing sharehold-
ers are then permitted to convert their rights into a larger number of
shares, if the bidder, who would be excluded from the plan, acquired in
excess of a certain threshold percentage of target shares.174  That is to say,
if an acquirer triggers a rights plan by breaching the instrument’s speci-
fied ownership threshold, the hostile acquirer’s position in the target com-
pany would be diluted upon target shareholders exercising their rights to
purchase additional shares at a deflated price point, thereby increasing
the unwanted suitor’s costs associated with attempting to complete the
acquisition.
As mentioned above, Sections 361–368 do not deprive public benefit
corporations of the protections afforded to traditional, for-profit corpora-
tions.175  The effect of rights plans at Delaware-based mission-driven enti-
ties is similarly devastating to acquirers subject to their operation.  That is
to say,
[w]ithout shareholder approval, a board of directors could
within hours of a hostile tender offer install a poison pill that
would make completing the tender exorbitantly expensive.  Al-
though the bidder could, in theory, wage a proxy battle to take
over the board and remove the pill, if the pill was combined with
other defenses, such as a classified or staggered board, the result-
172. Id. at 1048 (citing John C. Coates IV, Empirical Evidence on Structural Take-
over Defense: Where Do We Stand?, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 783, 797 (2000)).
173. Kahan & Rock, supra note 169, at 876 (citing Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier
Kraakman, Delaware’s Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance to
Proportionality Review? 44 BUS. LAW. 247, 256–60 (1989)).
174. See Moran v. Household Int’l Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1354 (Del. 1985) (up-
holding permissibility of discriminatory poison pills, as result of fact when “Board
of Directors is faced with a tender offer and a request to redeem the Rights, they
will not be able to arbitrarily reject the offer.  They will be held to the same fiduci-
ary standards any other board of directors would be held to in originally approving
the Rights Plan”).
175. For a discussion of the relationship between Sections 361–368 and pro-
tections for public benefit corporations, see supra note 141 and accompanying
text.
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ing delay in completing the deal would be fatal to the entire
acquisition.176
Furthermore, over a longer time period, “[t]he pill works to prevent a
creeping takeover whereby effective negative control over a corporation is
acquired without the payment of a control premium.”177  Using a share-
holder rights plan to combat the threat of a “creeping takeover” at a pub-
lic benefit corporation would thus ensure that impact investors receive
both adequate financial remuneration for their ownership of a social en-
terprise and assurance that a hostile acquirer will be unable to methodi-
cally degrade a company’s social and environmental commitments by
obtaining “negative control” via gradual expansion of its stock holdings.178
Despite its widespread use since its invention in the 1980s, the poison
pill has long been subject to pressure from academics179 and institutional
investors.180  Public benefit corporations, according to Professor J. Haskell
Murray, are in a unique position to respond to those calling for the repeal
of poison pills.181
The benefit corporation solves [the institutional investor] prob-
lem by signaling that it is interested in a different type of inves-
tor—an investor focused on multiple bottom lines.  The benefit
corporation investor will be less likely to pressure for the removal
of these takeover defenses because she has been attracted to the
benefit corporation, at least in part, because of its mission.182
Similarly, because the mandate of directors at public benefit corporations
is to manage or direct the affairs of the corporation in a manner that con-
siders the company’s mission, they may have social and environmental jus-
tifications available to them for a respective decision not to redeem a
poison pill.  Those justifications, moreover, may not simply be ignored in
reaching a decision to redeem a pill without being confronted by litiga-
tion.183  Nonetheless, given the individual missions of public benefit cor-
porations, the circumstances under which directors may refuse to redeem
a rights plan have broadened, and pills at public benefit corporations may
be bolstered by the social enterprise’s benefit purposes, furthering the im-
176. Edelman & Thomas, supra note 77, at 1093 (footnote omitted).
177. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reac-
tion to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 449,
497 (2014).
178. See id.
179. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate
Takeovers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 973, 977–81 (2002).
180. See generally Mark R. Wingerson & Christopher H. Dorn, Institutional In-
vestors in the U.S. and the Repeal of Poison Pills: A Practitioner’s Perspective, 1992 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 223.
181. Murray, Defending Patagonia, supra note 110, at 504.
182. Id.
183. See Strine, Making It Easier, supra note 20, at 248.
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pact of the defensive mechanism and complicating a hostile acquirer’s
ability to force the redemption of a pill.
IV. AIRGAS AND EBAY REDUX: APPLYING UNOCAL
TO PUBLIC BENEFIT CORPORATIONS
A. Doctrinal Likeness
To date, hostile takeovers have not made their way to the social enter-
prise market.184  However, as discussed in Part III above, the growing at-
tractiveness of the public benefit corporation’s business space likely means
that interested and unwanted bidders are lurking on the horizon.  “Take-
overs, in the ‘market for corporate control,’ are often considered one way
to discipline managers and keep them accountable.  Some may argue that
benefit corporation statutes destroy this path to accountability as well.”185
That is to say, the undefined flexibility of leadership at public benefit cor-
porations faced with a hostile bid undermines managerial incentives to act
in the best interests of the company, its public benefit purpose, its non-
financial stakeholders, and its shareholders.  The threshold questions of
how and to what extent may directors adopt takeover defense mechanisms
at these social enterprises are, in many ways, not dissimilar to the chal-
lenges posed to the Delaware judiciary in reaching its decision in Airgas.
In Airgas, the target company was subject to multiple rounds of hostile
offers to acquire all of its outstanding stock, which the board of directors
met with unflinching rejection.  Prior to the initial offer from Air Prod-
ucts, Airgas had in place both a shareholder rights plan and a classified
board.186  The two mechanisms, in combination, provided Airgas with a
potent defensive cocktail,187 requiring the bidder “to initiate two succes-
sive proxy contests to elect a majority of Airgas directors” who would be
184. See Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation, supra note 7, at 366 n.119 (“There
have yet to be any reported hostile takeovers in the benefit corporation context.”);
see also Daniel Fisher, Delaware ‘Public Benefit Corporation’ Lets Directors Serve Three
Masters Instead of One, FORBES (July 16, 2013), www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/
2013/07/16/delaware-public-benefit-corporation-lets-directors-serve-three-mas-
ters-instead-of-one/ [http://perma.cc/FY2W-GQD9] (quoting Model’s drafter,
William Clark, stating that “[w]e haven’t had a hostile run at a benefits corpora-
tion yet” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
185. J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social Enterprise, Certifications,
and Benefit Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1, 39 (2012) (footnote omit-
ted); see also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transac-
tions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 700 (1982); Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for
Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 112–19 (1965); Henry G. Manne, The
“Higher Criticism” of the Modern Corporation, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 399, 411 (1962).
186. See Davidoff, supra note 146, at 508–09.
187. See Allen et al., supra note 153, at 1095 n.85 (“Recent scholarship sug-
gests that an effective classified board is the most potent defensive weapon availa-
ble (when combined with a poison pill) and can be used to make a hostile takeover
fight quite unattractive for all but the most hearty of acquirors.” (citation
omitted)).
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willing to redeem the pill.188  Due to the staggered board and the target’s
annual meeting schedule, the redemption process could have taken up to
two years.189  Following arguments in the Delaware Supreme Court, Chan-
cellor Chandler ruled in favor of Airgas, writing, perhaps unwillingly:
I am thus bound by this clear precedent to proceed on the as-
sumption that Airgas’ defensive measures are not preclusive if
they delay Air Products from obtaining control of the Airgas
board (even if that delay is significant) so long as obtaining con-
trol at some point in the future is realistically attainable.190
The “realistically attainable” standard followed in Chancellor Chandler’s
Airgas decision is applicable to Delaware public benefit corporations and
the mandate of directors at such entities to manage or direct the business
and affairs of the public benefit corporation in a manner that balances the
pecuniary interests of the stockholders, the best interests of those materi-
ally affected by the corporation’s conduct, and the specific public benefit
or public benefits identified in its certificate of incorporation.  That is to
say, ultimately, the issues litigated in Airgas are not far removed from the
questions posed when directors at public benefit corporations layer defen-
sive measures on top of their statutorily granted ability to promote and
protect the company’s social mission, in that the ability to “say no” for
benefit purpose reasons in combination with defensive measures merely
complicates a change of control, but apparently does not make such a
change unrealistically attainable at some point in the future.191  The de-
fensive recipe instead requires that bidders in search of a change of con-
trol transaction present target companies with offers encompassing the
objectives stated in a given public benefit corporation’s certificate of
incorporation.
In eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark,192 Chancellor Chandler
considered whether craigslist, Inc.’s corporate culture was a defensible in-
terest, justifying the adoption of a poison pill, when faced with acquisition
overtures from eBay.193  Following a Unocal analysis, the Chancellor asked
two questions in considering the issue: “First, did Jim and Craig [the ma-
jority shareholders of craigslist] properly and reasonably perceive a threat
to craigslist’s corporate policy and effectiveness?  Second, if they did, is the
Rights Plan a proportional response to that threat?”194  Jim and Craig ar-
gued that the threat to craigslist would “materialize” once they had both
passed away and their shares in the company were distributed to their
188. Davidoff, supra note 146, at 509.
189. See id.
190. Id. at 532 (citing Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc. (In re Airgas
Inc. S’holder Litig.), 16 A.3d 48, 115 (Del. Ch. 2011)).
191. See id.
192. 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010).
193. See id.
194. Id. at 31–32.
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heirs.195  “At that point, [Jim and Craig said], ‘eBay’s acquisition of con-
trol [via the anticipated acquisition of Jim or Craig’s shares from some
combination of their heirs] would fundamentally alter craigslist’s values,
culture and business model, including departing from [craigslist’s] public-
service mission in favor of increased monetization of craigslist.’”196
In reaching the decision to strike down the craigslist poison pill,
Chancellor Chandler noted that Jim and Craig “failed to prove that craig-
slist possesse[d] a palpable, distinctive, and advantageous culture that suf-
ficiently promote[d] stockholder value . . . .”197  While holding the rights
plan to be unlawful, the Chancellor acknowledged that the Delaware Su-
preme Court in Time “accepted defensive action by the directors of a Dela-
ware corporation as a good faith effort to protect a specific corporate
culture.”198  Considering the applicability of the holdings in eBay and Time
to public benefit corporations, the fact-specific nature of the court’s ap-
proval of the defensive measures at Time is likely more reflective of the
issues presented to the Delaware judiciary in determining the propriety of
similar protective actions taken at mission-driven entities when faced with
a hostile offer, in that corporate leadership may seek to preserve the com-
pany’s commitment to its individualized social mission.  The public benefit
corporation is, perhaps, the corporate form most reliant on its tailored
public commitment to the promotion of social value in order to preserve
and advance shareholder well-being and, thus, a prime space for the Dela-
ware courts to allow for the consideration of interests extrinsic to share-
holder financial welfare in defending against a hostile offer, as corporate
social benefit identity and environmental responsibility are integral to
both perceived and realized impact investor value.
To the extent that Unocal applies to Delaware public benefit corpora-
tions defending against a hostile takeover, the corporate law has built-in
the authority for a board to “have regard for various constituencies in dis-
charging its responsibilities, provided there are rationally related benefits
accruing to the stockholders,” even in the traditional for-profit corpora-
tion context.199  With respect to social enterprises and impact investors,
management actions advancing a corporation’s social missions conceivably
deliver shareholder benefits despite not being financial in nature. Well-
intentioned defensive measures adopted by corporate leadership in fur-
therance of the entity’s social mission therefore presumably provide bene-
fits accruing to impact investors.
Accordingly, the additional layer of protection provided by benefit
purpose requires a bidder to approach with a well-developed, socially re-
195. See id. at 32.
196. Id. (second and third alterations in original).
197. Id. at 33.
198. Id. at 32 (citing Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc. (In re Time Inc.
S’holder Litig.), 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990)).
199. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182
(Del. 1985).
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sponsible acquisition plan.  A suitor is required not only to  meet the non-
financial desires of social impact investors to successfully acquire a public
benefit corporation, but also to face the reality that “the board must con-
sider these interests and cannot compromise them away without facing a
lawsuit.”200  In short, bidders seeking to acquire Delaware-based, mission-
driven entities need be prepared to cope with a public benefit corporation
directorship’s “leverage to extract desirable, enforceable protections for
other constituencies as well as commitments to responsible, sustainable
conduct from buyers, joint venture partners, and the like.”201  Thus, inso-
far as Unocal permits “boards [to] legitimately [ ] consider a host of other
constituencies when defending against takeover attempts” in the tradi-
tional for-profit corporation scenario,202 Section 365(a)’s statutory man-
date should enable public benefit corporation directors to take actions
necessary to guard their company’s social and environmental commitment
without fear of liability.
B. The Practical Import of Conscientious Judicial Decision-Making
The importance of Delaware’s foremost position in the realm of cor-
poration law is well-documented.203  To that end, the state’s “financial self-
interest in legal excellence leads to a productive dynamic for the creation
and maintenance of an efficient and fair corporation law,” which is prima-
rily dominated by the interests of managers and stockholders.204  The pol-
icy foundations of the Delaware corporate law, according to Professor
Lawrence Hamermesh, are:
(1) an abiding conservatism, in the sense of a reluctance to make
any change without clear evidence that significant benefits (pri-
marily in the form of convenience or clarity) will result; (2) a
related desire to protect commercial relationships and expecta-
200. Strine, Making It Easier, supra note 20, at 248.
201. Id.
202. Lisa M. Fairfax, Doing Well While Doing Good: Reassessing the Scope of Direc-
tors’ Fiduciary Obligations in For-Profit Corporations with Non-Shareholder Beneficiaries, 59
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 409, 447 (“The [Unocal] court specifically noted that one of
the concerns that directors legitimately could consider was ‘the impact on constitu-
encies other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps
even the community generally).  This decision marks one of the first times the
Delaware court explicitly condoned the social entity model.  Moreover, it reveals
that as long as a board is not willing to sell its company, it can institute defens[ive]
measures aimed at protecting groups other than shareholders.” (footnotes
omitted)).
203. See generally Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Com-
petition for Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061 (2000); Lawrence A.
Hamermesh, The Policy Foundations of Delaware Corporate Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
1749 (2006); Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of
Corporate Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1573 (2005); Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Delaware Way:
How We Do Corporate Law and Some of the New Challenges We (and Europe) Face, 30 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 673 (2005).
204. Strine, supra note 203, at 680.
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tions that have been built up in reference to preexisting legal
rules; (3) a preference that the details of corporate law be
shaped in a common law fashion, with courts as first responders
to tensions within the corporate law, at least in areas that are not
susceptible to simple statutory clarification; and (4) a preference
for enhancement of private ordering opportunities, so long as
the basic scheme of fiduciary duty principles and the allocation
of authority among directors, officers, and stockholders remains
essentially unchanged.205
The jurists that sit on the benches of the Delaware Supreme Court and the
Court of Chancery are the bastions of the foregoing foundational princi-
ples, ensuring the quality and reasonableness of Delaware’s corporate law,
in addition to its primacy.  “In Delaware, judge-made law, to the virtual
exclusion of statutory law, governs fundamental issues” of the corporate
realm,206 with the state’s highest court having “shown a certain degree of
discomfort with, perhaps even hostility to, legislative intrusions into its do-
main.”207  Similarly, being fully aware of the judiciary’s clout and experi-
ence, the Delaware legislature has been loath to insert itself into the
corporate law decisions of the Supreme Court and Chancery Court, such
that “overturning of judge-made corporate law is practically unheard
of.”208
With Delaware’s commitment to its corporate law positioning and the
significance of the state’s judiciary in mind, Stephen M. Davidoff provoca-
tively and compellingly argued in his piece, A Case Study: Air Products v.
Airgas and the Value of Strategic Judicial Decision-Making, that the import of
the various holdings in the Airgas saga may extend beyond precedent and
instead reach to conscientious Delaware decision-making, benefitting the
state’s stronghold on corporate law by allowing the “courts to fine-tune
jurisprudence not only to meet their needs, but for the wider corporate
community.  Strategic jurisprudence allows Delaware to look past endoge-
nous decisional effects toward larger principles of law.”209  In other words,
“judge-made Delaware law eschews hard rules in favor of flexible and
highly fact-intensive standards.  This results in an extraordinarily high de-
gree of flexibility.”210  With such latitude available to them, the Delaware
judiciary should adapt the Unocal standard to fit the unique features of the
public benefit corporation, such that questions of preclusivity and coer-
civeness do not invade well-intentioned decisions to implement defensive
measures necessary to guard a mission-driven entity’s respective social and
environmental objectives.
205. Hamermesh, supra note 203, at 1787.
206. Kahan & Rock, supra note 203, at 1591.
207. Id. at 1594.
208. Id. at 1595.
209. Davidoff, supra note 146, at 507.
210. Kahan & Rock, supra note 203, at 1598 (footnote omitted).
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Nonetheless, Chief Justice Strine has rightly noted:
[T]he first wave of entrepreneurs who drape themselves in the
benefit corporation garb bear a special responsibility for the
movement’s ultimate fate.  If their commitment to social respon-
sibility is simply a green-washed cloak for a desire to squeeze out
profits for themselves and stockholders by feigning but not actu-
ally having a sincere regard for other corporate constituencies,
the benefit corporation movement will quickly lose credibility
among socially responsible investors and policymakers.211
The other side of this observation, however, is that if Delaware wishes to
incentivize mission-driven entrepreneurs to incorporate their businesses
in the state, the legal regime underlying the presence of public benefit
corporations must adjudge the furtherance of their social and environ-
mental purposes and motivations without fundamentally compromising
the viability of their business models.  In other words, to the extent that
Unocal leaves public benefit corporations susceptible to takeover by imped-
ing a Delaware-based social enterprise’s freedom to adopt a menu of de-
fensive measures to supplement the ability to promote and protect its
benefit purpose, mission-driven entities may very well migrate to the host
of states that are in the market to loosen Delaware’s clutch on corporate
law and that may more effectively facilitate the preservation and protec-
tion of mission.
V. CONCLUSION
The opaqueness of Section 365(a)’s balancing test, the Unocal doc-
trine, and the managerial fidelity to social mission interact in a multitude
of complex ways that will ultimately challenge directors, acquirers, and the
judiciary to reshape Delaware takeover law.  The requirement that leader-
ship at public benefit corporations manage and direct the affairs of the
company in a way that considers the specific public benefit or public bene-
fits identified in its certificate of incorporation should not deprive direc-
tors of Delaware-based socially responsible businesses of the various
defensive measures otherwise available to management at traditional for-
profit corporations merely because social enterprise leadership has a novel
avenue of justification for thwarting unwanted suitors in the form of social
and environmental mission.  Indeed, insofar as the Delaware legislature
believes that public benefit corporations necessitate statutory provisions
independent of traditional corporations, should the corporate form’s uni-
queness not also be acknowledged by permitting the adoption of defensive
measures in the face of the diversity of new, exceptional, and cognizable
threats that may diverge from the financial dangers customarily consid-
ered by Unocal?  As the Delaware Supreme Court has previously provided,
the justices and chancellors “will not substitute [their] views for those of
211. Strine, Making It Easier, supra note 20, at 249.
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the board if the latter’s decision can be ‘attributed to any rational business
purpose’” and, in the framework of public benefit corporations, social
mission is presumably a rational business purpose defined in the com-
pany’s charter.212
This Article does not seek to remove Delaware public benefit corpora-
tions from the auspices of the Unocal doctrine when directors adopt defen-
sive tactics in response to being confronted by unwanted suitors.  Rather,
due to the interplay between the competing interests, motivations, and
characteristics attending the social enterprise form, its aim is to suggest
that the Delaware courts should carefully consider whether to expand the
reasonableness and proportionality inquiry, such that the judiciary may
embrace new variations of threats posed to corporate policy and effective-
ness, in addition to new concoctions of defensive measures designed to
ward off hostile bidders in protection of mission.  Directors, however, have
a strong defensive card to play in the form of benefit purpose, and the
onus will be on management at public benefit corporations to appropri-
ately justify defensive measures under the cloak of social and environmen-
tal commitment, so as to not undermine the viability of the Delaware
social enterprise form by “green-wash[ing]” actions for self-interested or
profit-extracting purposes.213  Ultimately, when confronted with a Unocal
question in the public benefit corporation context, the flexibility of Dela-
ware’s corporate law framework and the foundational principles underly-
ing it put both the judiciary and public benefit corporation directorships
in a meaningful position to redefine the reach and applicability of a semi-
nal corporate law doctrine in a way that does justice to the alternative,
beneficial objectives of mission-driven entities committed to doing well by
doing good.
212. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 949 (Del. 1985)
(quoting Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971)).
213. Strine, Making It Easier, supra note 20, at 249.
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